Quels fondements à l’incomplétude des contrats?*

Following the recent controversy on the foundations of incomplete contract theory (Maskin and Tirole, 1999; Hart and Moore, 1999; Tirole, 1999), this survey aims at defining the very nature and origin of the contract incompleteness. Two main results are shown: (i) reasons usually advanced to explain incompleteness, such as the indescribability of future contingencies or the asymmetric information between the contracting parties, are not necessarily relevant; (ii) coupled with the constraint of initial contract renegotiation, the unverifiability constraint, a key notion in incomplete contract theory, allows to derive an endogenous choice of incompleteness. More precisely, incomplete contract theory shows that an incomplete contract can be defined as a limit form of a complete contract. Se situant dans le droit fil de la récente controverse sur les fondements de la théorie des contrats incomplets (Maskin et Tirole, 1999 ; Hart et Moore, 1999 ; Tirole, 1999), cette revue de la littérature cherche à définir la notion d’incomplétude contractuelle et à en comprendre l’origine. Deux résultats importants sont dégagés : (i) les raisons traditionnellement avancées pour expliquer l’incomplétude contractuelle, telles que l’indescriptibilité des contingences futures ou l’asymétrie d’information entre les parties contractantes, ne sont pas forcément pertinentes ; (ii) la contrainte d’invérifiabilité, concept clé de la théorie des contrats incomplets, parvient à rendre compte d’un choix d’incomplétude lorsqu’elle est couplée à la contrainte de renégociation du contrat initial. Cette double contrainte permet à la théorie des contrats incomplets de générer un choix endogène d’incomplétude. Plus précisément, cette théorie montre que l’on peut définir un choix de contrat incomplet comme une forme limite du contrat complet.

Socio-technical lock-in hinders crop diversification in France

International audienceCrop diversification is considered as a major lever to increase the sustainability of arable farming systems, allowing reduced inputs (irrigation water, pesticides, fertilizers), increasing the heterogeneity of habitat mosaics, or reducing yield gap associated with too frequent returns of the same species. To free up paths of collective action, this article highlights obstacles to crop diversification, existing at various levels of the value chains. We used a threefold approach: (i) a cross-cutting analysis of impediments to the development of 11 diversifying crops (5 species of grain legumes, alfalfa, flax, hemp, linseed, mustard, sorghum), based on published documents and on 30 interviews of stakeholders in French value chains; (ii) a detailed study (55 semi-structured surveys, including 39 farmers) of three value chains: pea and linseed for animal feed, hemp for insulation and biomaterials; and (iii) a bibliometric analysis of the technical journals and websites (180 articles) to characterize the nature of information diffused to farmers. We highlight that the development of minor crops is hindered by a socio-technical lock-in in favor of the dominant species (wheat, rapeseed, maize, etc.). We show for the first time that this lock-in is characterized by strongly interconnected impediments, occurring at every link of the value chains, such as lack of availability of improved varieties and methods of plant protection, scarcity of quantified references on crop successions, complexity of the knowledge to be acquired by farmers, logistical constraints to harvest collection, and difficulties of coordination within the emerging value chains. On the basis of this lock-in analysis, that could concern other European countries, the article proposes levers aimed at encouraging actors to incorporate a greater diversity of crops into their productive systems: adaptation of standards and labelling, better coordination between stakeholders to fairly share added value within value chains, and combination of genetic, agronomic, technological, and organizational innovations

Brokers as experts in the french wine industry

International audienceThe increasing industrialization of the wine supply chain is often associated with a greater vertical coordination. Our paper shows that a spot market institutional arrangement like brokerage can still be a relevant coordination mechanism to mitigate the contractual hazards due to quality problems. Indeed, a broker can be viewed as an expert that can help the merchant to monitor the grower’s wine quality process. More precisely, if the merchant cannot credibly monitor the wine making process, it is Pareto improving to delegate this task to a broker. (JEL Classification: D82, L80, M12

Wine Brokers as Independent Experts

International audienceThis paper aims to show that an institutional arrangement such as brokerage is an efficient coordination mechanism to mitigate the contractual hazards in the relationship between merchants and wine growers. We explain its efficiency by considering brokers as independent experts that can help merchants to monitor the growers' wine-making process. More precisely, when the merchant cannot observe the grower's production effort and finds it costly to commit to a credible monitoring of the wine quality process, it can be efficient to delegate the monitoring task to the broker. Thus, delegation to a third party has a commitment effec

Quels fondements à l'incomplétude des contrats ?

National audienceSe situant dans le droit fil de la récente controverse sur les fondements de la théorie des contrats incomplets, l'article cherche à définir la notion d'incomplétude contractuelle et à en appréhender l'origine. Deux résultats importants sont dégagés. D'abord les raisons traditionnellement avancées pour expliquer l'incomplétude contractuelle, telles que l'indescriptibilité des contingences futures ou l'asymétrie d'information entre les parties, ne semblent pas pertinentes. Ensuite la contrainte d'invérifiabilité parvient à rendre compte d'un choix d'incomplétude lorsqu'elle est couplée à la contrainte de renégociation du contrat initial. Cette double contrainte permet à la théorie des contrats incomplets un choix endogène d'incomplétude. Plus précisément, cette théorie montre que l'on peut définir un choix de contrat incomplet (ou vide) comme une forme limite du contrat contingent

[Une solution au problème du hold-up dans le cadre d'une structure verticale à trois niveaux]

Diffusion du document : INRA Unité Mixte de Recherche MOISA Marchés Organisations Institutions et Stratégies d'acteurs 2 place Viala 34060 Montpellier Cedex 1 (FRA)International audienceCette note analyse en toute généralité les conditions d'implémentation d'une solution efficace dans le cadre d'une structure contractuelle verticale à trois niveaux. Elle met en évidence deux résultats. Premièrement, une configuration centralisée de cette structure, i. e. une configuration où l'une des parties obtient l'ensemble du pouvoir de marchandage dans le jeu de renégociation, permet d'obtenir une solution de premier rang. Deuxièmement, une configuration décentralisée, i. e. une configuration où le pouvoir de marchandage est partagé entre les parties, permet de répliquer cette solution efficace si la renégociation est séquentielle. Sous cette condition, cette configuration permet aussi d'assurer un partage efficace du risque

Un contrat à obligation d’exécution peut-il résoudre le problème du hold-up ?

National audienceThis paper aims to define the conditions under which a specific performance contract can solve the hold-up problem. We mainly show two results. First, in a very general environment the efficient solution is achieved only with renegotiation design. Second, in a specific environment where the valuation functions satisfy a separability condition, the efficient solution is implemented only because there is an equivalence result between this condition and a state independence assumption. This implies that a specific performance contrat is unecessary since a voluntary contract is also able to achieve efficiency

Specific performance, separability condition and the hold-up problem

International audienceEdlin and Reichelstein (1996) claim that an efficient solution to the hold-up problem can be implemented with a specific performance contract if a separability condition is satisfied, i.e. if the effect of investments and the effect of the state of the world enter the parties valuation functions in an additively separable manner. This note shows that this separability condition generates the same solution than if the valuation functions are independent of the sate of nature(proposition 1). This implies that a simple menu of prices that does not specify the level of trade can solve the hold-up problem (proposition 2). That is, specifying the terms of trade by writing a specific performance contract is useless with the separability condition